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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This case presents the novel question of what remedy 
is available to the Government when a criminal defendant 
who knowingly and voluntarily executed a waiver of right to 
appeal — and received valuable promises from the 
Government in return — violates his plea agreement by filing 
an appeal.  Christopher Erwin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute oxycodone, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 21 
U.S.C. § 846.  His agreement included a waiver of right to 
appeal his sentence if it was within or below the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines range that results from a total advisory 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) offense 
level of 39.  The Government agreed not to bring further 
criminal charges against Erwin in connection with the 
conspiracy, and it also agreed to seek a downward departure 
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  The Government fulfilled its part of 
the bargain; Erwin, who challenges his within-Guidelines 
sentence on appeal, did not. 
 
 For the following reasons, we conclude that Erwin’s 
appeal is within the scope of his appellate waiver, to which he 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed, and that he has failed to 
raise any meritorious grounds for circumventing the waiver.  
We further conclude that Erwin breached the plea agreement 
by appealing, and that the appropriate remedy for his breach 
is specific performance of the agreement’s terms:  that is, the 
Government will be excused from its obligation to move for a 
downward departure.  We will therefore vacate Erwin’s 
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judgment of sentence and remand for de novo resentencing in 
accordance with this opinion. 
I. 
 
From approximately January 2009 through December 
2010, Erwin managed a large-scale oxycodone distribution 
ring (the “Erwin Organization”) that operated throughout the 
State of New Jersey and elsewhere.  The Erwin 
Organization’s modus operandi was to obtain medically 
unnecessary prescriptions for oxycodone from licensed 
physicians Hassan Lahham and Jacqueline Lopresti, in 
Erwin’s name and others’ names, in exchange for cash.  
Erwin’s customers, posing as patients, filled the prescriptions 
at various pharmacies in New Jersey and New York.  The 
conspiracy yielded hundreds of thousands of oxycodone 
tablets, which were illegally sold on the black market. 
 
On May 9, 2011, the Government filed a sealed 
criminal complaint against Erwin, Lahham, Lopresti, and 
nineteen others in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  The complaint charged each 
defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled 
substance.  On May 8, 2012, Erwin executed a written plea 
agreement with the Government in which he agreed to plead 
guilty to a one-count information charging him with the 
above-referenced conspiracy that would later be filed in the 
District Court.1  The Government, in turn, agreed not to bring 
further criminal charges against Erwin in connection with the 
conspiracy. 
 
Schedule A of the plea agreement set forth, inter alia, 
several stipulations addressing Erwin’s offense level under 
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines:  (1) based on the quantity 
of oxycodone for which Erwin was responsible (6,912 
grams), his base offense level was 38, see U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(c)(1); (2) Erwin was subject to a four-level 
enhancement for his leadership role in the conspiracy, see id. 
                                              
1 The information was filed on May 24, 2012.  Erwin waived 
his right to indictment and entered his guilty plea that day.  
The information was later superseded to add a forfeiture 
count; Erwin consented in writing to being sentenced thereon. 
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§ 3B1.1(a); and (3) Erwin qualified for a three-level 
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, see id. 
§ 3E1.1.  In accordance with the above, the parties agreed that 
the total Guidelines offense level applicable to Erwin was 39.  
The parties further agreed that “a sentence within the 
Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level is reasonable.”  Appendix (“App.”) 15 ¶ 7. 
 
Paragraph 8 of Schedule A contained the following 
waiver of right to appeal: 
 
Christopher Erwin knows that he has and, 
except as noted below in this paragraph, 
voluntarily waives, the right to file any appeal, . 
. . including but not limited to an appeal under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 . . . , which challenges the 
sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that 
sentence falls within or below the Guidelines 
range that results from a total Guidelines 
offense level of 39.  This Office [the United 
States Attorney for the District of New Jersey] 
will not file any appeal, motion[,] or writ which 
challenges the sentence imposed by the 
sentencing court if that sentence falls within or 
above the Guidelines range that results from a 
total Guidelines offense level of 39.  The parties 
reserve any right they may have under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal the sentencing court’s 
determination of the criminal history category.  
The provisions of this paragraph are binding on 
the parties even if the Court employs a 
Guidelines analysis different from that 
stipulated to herein.  Furthermore, if the 
sentencing court accepts a stipulation, both 
parties waive the right to file an appeal . . . 
claiming that the sentencing court erred in 
doing so. 
  
Id. ¶ 8.  Both parties reserved the right to “oppose or move to 
dismiss” any appeal barred by the above paragraph.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 
 Erwin also entered into a written cooperation 
agreement with the Government.  The agreement provided 
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that, if the Government determined “in its sole discretion” 
that Erwin substantially assisted in the investigation or 
criminal prosecution of others, it would ask the court to 
depart downward from the Guidelines range pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  Supplemental Appendix (“Supp. App.”) 
47.  However, “[s]hould Christopher Erwin . . . violate any 
provision of this cooperation agreement or the plea 
agreement, . . . this Office will be released from its 
obligations under this agreement and the plea agreement, 
including any obligation to file [the] motion . . . .”  Supp. 
App. 48 (emphasis added).  “In addition, Christopher Erwin 
shall thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal 
criminal violation of which this Office has knowledge . . . .”  
Id.  The plea and cooperation agreements “together 
constitute[d] the full and complete agreement between the 
parties.”  Supp. App. 46.  For the sake of brevity, we will 
refer to them collectively as the plea agreement. 
 
 During the next several months, Erwin attended 
debriefing sessions at which he was “questioned extensively.”  
Supp. App. 53.  In particular, he reviewed and explained 
documents critical to the Government investigation of the 
Erwin Organization, including his records, coconspirators’ 
medical files, and prescriptions.  Id.  Erwin also agreed to 
testify against Lopresti and Lahham, influencing their 
decisions to plead guilty.  Id.  In light of Erwin’s “important 
and timely” assistance, the Government wrote a letter to the 
court on July 12, 2013, asking it to depart downward “from 
the otherwise applicable” Guidelines range and to consider 
Erwin’s cooperation “in mitigation of [his] sentence.”  Supp. 
App. 54. 
 
 The United States Probation Office’s Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”), as revised on July 15, 2013, 
mirrored the parties’ stipulations as to Erwin’s offense level 
and determined that Erwin’s criminal history category was I.  
The PSR noted, however, that Erwin’s advisory Guidelines 
“range” was 240 months (20 years) “due to the statutory 
maximum.”2  PSR ¶ 187.  A sentence of 240 months, for an 
                                              
2 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a), “[w]here the statutorily 
authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of 
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offender in criminal history category I, falls within the low 
end of the range resulting from offense level 38 and the 
middle of the range resulting from offense level 37.  See 
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table). 
 
 Erwin’s sentencing hearing was held on July 25, 2013.  
The District Court agreed with the parties and the PSR that:  
(1) Erwin’s base offense level based on the quantity of 
oxycodone attributable to him was 38; (2) Erwin was subject 
to a four-level enhancement for his leadership role in the 
conspiracy; and (3) Erwin qualified for a three-level 
downward adjustment for his acceptance of responsibility.  
Erwin’s total offense level of 39 and criminal history category 
of I yielded an initial Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months 
of imprisonment.  The court noted that Erwin’s sentence was 
“capped at” 240 months “because of the statutory maximum.”  
App. 22.  Citing its July letter to the court, the Government 
then moved for a five-level downward departure pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  The Government clarified that, to the 
extent there “may be some question as to where to start,” it 
was requesting a departure from offense level 39 to offense 
level 34, as opposed to from the statutory maximum of 240 
months.  App. 24.  Erwin did not object, and the court granted 
the Government’s motion.  Erwin’s final Guidelines range 
was 151 to 188 months of imprisonment.  After considering 
the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court imposed a 
within-Guidelines sentence of 188 months, three years of 
supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.   
 
 Erwin timely appealed, arguing that the District 
Court’s use of offense level 39 as its starting point for the 
downward departure was error because, when combined with 
criminal history category I, offense level 39 yields an 
advisory Guidelines range above the statutory maximum.  
The Government did not cross-appeal.  It counters, however, 
that this Court should vacate and remand for de novo 
resentencing where it will seek a “modest increase” in 
Erwin’s sentence in light of his breach of the appellate 
waiver.  Gov’t Br. 34. 
 
                                                                                                     
the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized 
maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” 
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II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
prosecution of this criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction over Erwin’s appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Because the 
Government has invoked the appellate waiver in Erwin’s plea 
agreement, however, we will “decline to review the merits of 
[his] appeal” if we conclude that:  (1) the issues raised fall 
within the scope of the appellate waiver; and (2) he 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver; 
unless (3) enforcing the waiver would “work a miscarriage of 
justice.”  United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125, 128–29 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).  “The validity and 
scope of an appellate waiver involves a question of law and 
is, therefore, reviewed de novo.”  United States v. Wilson, 
707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
 Erwin waived the right to file any appeal challenging 
his sentence, including but not limited to an appeal under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742, “if that sentence falls within or below the 
Guidelines range that results from a total Guidelines offense 
level of 39,” with the caveat that both parties reserved the 
right to appeal the court’s determination of Erwin’s criminal 
history category.  App. 15 ¶ 8.  Erwin was sentenced to 188 
months of imprisonment, which is far below the 262- to 327-
month Guidelines range that results from a total offense level 
of 39 and criminal history category of I.  It is also below the 
240-month statutory maximum.  Erwin does not challenge his 
criminal history category.  His appeal fits squarely within the 
scope of the waiver.  Moreover, as Erwin acknowledges, see 
Erwin Br. 25, the District Court fulfilled its “critical” role of 
ensuring that his waiver of appeal was knowing and 
voluntary.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d 
Cir. 2001); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N) (requiring that 
before accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, the court must 
inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, 
“the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right 
to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence”).   
 
 Erwin’s appellate waiver must therefore be enforced 
unless we identify the “unusual circumstance” of “an error 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice” in his sentence.  
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Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562.  This determination depends on 
factors such as 
 
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its 
character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, 
a sentencing guideline, or a statutory 
maximum), the impact of the error on the 
defendant, the impact of correcting the error on 
the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result. 
 
Id. at 563 (first alteration in original) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 Erwin contends that enforcement of the waiver would 
be manifestly unjust because the District Court applied the 
Government’s downward departure motion to an 
“inapplicable” Guidelines range, thereby depriving him of the 
“benefit of his plea bargain and the full five-level departure 
the [D]istrict [C]ourt agreed he deserved.”  Erwin Br. 25–26.  
Erwin specifically argues that, because the statutory 
maximum (240 months) is less than the minimum of the 
Guidelines range resulting from offense level 39 and criminal 
history category I (262 to 327 months), the court should have 
departed downward from 240 months — which, when 
combined with his criminal history category, roughly equates 
to offense level 38.  If the court had departed from offense 
level 38 to offense level 33, instead of from 39 to 34, Erwin’s 
final Guidelines range would have been 135 to 168 months 
instead of 151 to 188 months. 
 
 Erwin raises two constitutional grounds for 
circumvention of the appellate waiver and a claim of 
procedural error, none of which have merit.  Erwin first 
argues that the court violated the spirit of Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), where the Supreme Court held 
that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490.  The 
statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is “the maximum 
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sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis 
omitted).  Erwin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of 
oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance.  Erwin’s 
admission that he violated § 841(b)(1)(C) subjected him to a 
statutory maximum sentence of 20 years.  His 188-month 
sentence amounts to less than 16 years and thus did not 
violate Apprendi.3 
 
 Erwin’s second constitutional argument is that the 
District Court’s failure to depart to offense level 33 deprived 
him of his due process right to receive the full benefit of his 
bargain with the Government.  Under Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), “when a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement 
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”  Id. at 262.  
The Government in this case agreed to “move the sentencing 
judge,” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to depart from the 
otherwise applicable Guideline range if it determined in its 
sole discretion that Erwin provided substantial assistance.  
Supp. App. 47.  The agreement cautioned that, “[w]hether the 
sentencing judge does in fact impose a sentence below the 
otherwise applicable guideline range is a matter committed 
                                              
3 To the extent that Erwin challenges the court’s findings 
relevant to his initial Guidelines range, we have held that the 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt “attach[] only when the facts at issue have 
the effect of increasing the maximum punishment to which 
the defendant is exposed.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 565 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  Because the advisory 
Guidelines do not “alter[] the judge’s final sentencing 
authority,” they do not have this effect and an error in their 
application consequently does not trigger Apprendi or its 
progeny.  Id.; see also United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 
117 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), 
“did not curtail a sentencing court’s ability to find facts 
relevant in selecting a sentence within the prescribed statutory 
range”). 
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solely to the discretion of the sentencing judge.”  Id.  Because 
the record is devoid of any indication that the Government 
promised it would specifically request a five-level downward 
departure, much less that the court would apply the departure 
to the statutory maximum, Erwin’s due process claim also 
fails. 
 
 Erwin’s claim that the court committed procedural 
error fares no better.4  “[A] district court should begin all 
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 
(2007).  Even assuming the District Court erred procedurally 
when it applied the downward departure to the 262- to 327-
month range instead of to the statutory maximum, see 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 & cmt., its arguably erroneous calculation 
would be “precisely the kind of ‘garden variety’ claim of 
error contemplated by [an] appellate waiver,” United States v. 
Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 141–42 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks 
omitted).  See United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 931 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[A]llow[ing] alleged errors in computing a 
defendant’s sentence to render a waiver unlawful would 
nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was 
intended to waive.” (second alteration in original) (quotation 
marks omitted)); see also United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 
270, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that there was no 
miscarriage of justice where the defendant claimed that the 
Government abused its discretion by refusing to request a 
three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility); United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 243 
(3d Cir. 2008) (characterizing the defendant’s challenges to 
district court’s sentencing calculation as “insubstantial” 
because “[t]hey do not implicate fundamental rights or 
constitutional principles”).   
 
                                              
4 We lack jurisdiction to review the extent of a district court’s 
downward departure.  United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 
151–52 (3d Cir. 2001).  Erwin’s claim is reviewable because 
it is “premised on the theory that the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
misapplied the Guidelines.”  United States v. Shaw, 313 F.3d 
219, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2002); see United States v. Langford, 
516 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Erwin’s sentence did not exceed the 240-month 
maximum sentence prescribed by statute, let alone the higher 
advisory Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months.  Moreover, 
Erwin largely acquiesced in the claimed error by failing to 
lodge a contemporaneous objection.  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 
563.  We cannot conclude that, under these circumstances, 
enforcing Erwin’s waiver would work a miscarriage of 
justice.  His appeal is therefore barred by the appellate 
waiver. 
 
III. 
 
In circumstances where a defendant’s arguments on 
appeal are based on a valid appellate waiver, our ordinary 
procedure is to enforce the waiver by dismissing the 
defendant’s appeal, thereby affirming the defendant’s 
sentence.  E.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 248 
(3d Cir. 2011).  But the Government argues that merely 
dismissing Erwin’s appeal and affirming his sentence “would 
neither make the Government whole for the costs it has 
incurred because of Erwin’s breach nor adequately deter other 
cooperating defendants from similar breaches.”  Gov’t Br. 16.  
Instead, the Government asks the Court to vacate Erwin’s 
sentence so that it can pursue the remedies specified in the 
breach provision of the plea agreement — that is, the 
opportunity to bring additional criminal charges against 
Erwin or to withdraw its § 5K1.1 motion.  The Government 
indicates that, if granted that choice here, it would pursue the 
latter option.  Gov’t Br. 17, 34.  Erwin objects that the 
Government’s proposal “would, as a practical matter, end this 
Court’s review for miscarriage of justice, as defendants would 
be wary to appeal even in the most egregious cases of error.”  
Reply Br. 10. 
 
To address the Government’s argument, we examine 
three issues:  (1) whether Erwin in fact breached his plea 
agreement; (2) if so, whether resentencing in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement is an appropriate remedy in this 
case; and (3) even if this relief is appropriate, whether the 
cross-appeal rule divests this Court of jurisdiction or authority 
to grant it. 
 
A. 
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 “[P]lea agreements, although arising in the criminal 
context, are analyzed under contract law standards.”  United 
States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation 
marks omitted).  We have long exercised de novo review over 
the question of whether a Government breach has occurred.  
United States v. Warren, 642 F.3d 182, 187 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 293–94 (3d Cir. 
2004)).  Because “a plea agreement necessarily works both 
ways,” Castro, 704 F.3d at 135 (quotation marks omitted), we 
more recently held that the same standards apply when 
analyzing a claim that a defendant has breached a plea 
agreement, United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 424 (3d 
Cir. 2007).   
 
 In Williams, the defendant pleaded guilty to a 
narcotics offense pursuant to a written plea agreement.  Id. at 
418.  In the agreement, the parties stipulated as to Williams’s 
offense level and further agreed “not to seek or argue for any 
upward or downward departure or any upward or downward 
adjustment not set forth herein.”  Id. at 419 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Despite this promise, Williams sought downward 
departures under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and Chapter 5, as well as a 
downward variance.  Id. at 419–20.  Rejecting the 
Government’s position that Williams’s requests were 
foreclosed by the terms of the plea agreement, id. at 420, the 
district court reduced Williams’s criminal history category 
and varied downward from the resulting range, id. at 420–21.  
The Government appealed, asking this Court to resolve “what 
standard should be applied when analyzing a claim that a 
defendant has breached a plea agreement.”  Id. at 417.  
Because “the government would have no meaningful recourse 
if it performed its end of the agreement but did not receive the 
benefit of its bargain in return,” id. at 422–23, we held that 
the same standard of review applies in considering a 
defendant’s breach of a plea agreement as in a Government 
breach case — that is, “[w]e will review the question whether 
a defendant breaches his plea agreement de novo, and will 
impose the burden on the government to prove the breach by 
a preponderance of the evidence,” id. at 424.  Further, “we 
will analyze the issue whether a defendant has breached a 
plea agreement according to the same contract principles that 
we would apply in analyzing a government breach . . . .”  Id. 
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 “In determining whether [Erwin] breached his plea 
agreement, we examine the plain meaning of the agreement 
itself and construe any ambiguities in the agreement against 
the government as drafter.”  Id. at 424–25.  We need not draw 
any inferences here, however, because the relevant language 
is unambiguous.  Paragraph 1 of Schedule A of the plea 
agreement provided that the parties “agree[d] to the 
stipulations set forth herein,” including those concerning 
Erwin’s offense level.  App. 14 ¶ 1.  The stipulations included 
a waiver of Erwin’s right to challenge his sentence, including 
via a direct appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, “if that sentence 
falls within or below the Guidelines range that results from a 
total Guidelines offense level of 39.”  App. 15 ¶ 8.  Erwin’s 
188-month sentence is below the Guidelines range that results 
from an offense level of 39 and his undisputed criminal 
history category.  Despite promising not to appeal from such 
sentence, he did precisely that.5  Erwin’s appeal therefore 
amounts to a breach6 of the plea agreement. 
                                              
5 Erwin contended at oral argument that there was no breach 
because he merely waived the right to file an appeal as 
opposed to promised not to file an appeal.  See, e.g., Oral 
Arg. Tr. 4:08–5:23, 7:46–8:25 (3d Cir. May 20, 2014); see 
also Erwin Supplemental Br. 1 n.1.  Erwin has not proffered 
any principled basis for drawing this distinction, and common 
sense dictates that there is none.  A “waiver” is defined as 
“the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) 
(quotation marks omitted).  A “promise” is similarly defined 
as “a person’s assurance that the person will or will not do 
something.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1406 (10th ed. 2014).  
By waiving his right to appeal, Erwin relinquished that right; 
in so doing, he promised not to exercise it. 
6 Erwin does not dispute that, if he breached the agreement by 
filing an appeal, such breach was material.  Nor could he:  the 
breach defeated the parties’ bargained-for objective and 
deprived the Government of a substantial part of its benefit.  
See Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank v. Abdnor, 898 F.2d 334, 338 (3d 
Cir. 1990); see also Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ 
Prods., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1416–17 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s lawsuit, which was filed despite a 
general release in the parties’ settlement agreement, 
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B. 
 
 “[A] classic rule of contract law[] is that a party should 
be prevented from benefitting from its own breach.”  Assaf v. 
Trinity Med. Ctr., 696 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2012); see also 
United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(contract law prohibits a defendant from “get[ting] the 
benefits of [his] plea bargain, while evading the costs”).  This 
rule carries particular importance in the criminal context, as a 
court’s failure to enforce a plea agreement against a breaching 
defendant “would have a corrosive effect on the plea 
agreement process” by “render[ing] the concept of a binding 
agreement a legal fiction.”  Williams, 510 F.3d at 422, 423.  
Given that our criminal justice system depends upon the plea 
agreement process, that result cannot be countenanced.  Id. at 
423.7  As the Supreme Court explained in Blackledge v. 
Allison, 
 
the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea 
bargain are important components of this 
country’s criminal justice system.  Properly 
administered, they can benefit all concerned.  
The defendant avoids extended pretrial 
incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties 
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his 
case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a 
prompt start in realizing whatever potential 
there may be for rehabilitation.  Judges and 
prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources.  
The public is protected from the risks posed by 
those charged with criminal offenses who are at 
large on bail while awaiting completion of 
criminal proceedings. 
 
                                                                                                     
“constituted a material breach of the Settlement Agreement”), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 106 F.3d 427 
(Table) (Fed. Cir. 1997); Maslow v. Vanguri, 896 A.2d 408, 
423 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding that the appellant’s 
appeal of the jury’s verdict was a material breach of the “no 
appeals” provision in the parties’ settlement agreement). 
7 Of the 2,920 convictions in the district courts within our 
circuit in 2013, 2,780 (more than 95%) were by guilty plea. 
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431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).  “These advantages can be secured, 
however, only if dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a 
great measure of finality.”  Id.  Appellate waivers exist 
precisely because they preserve the finality of judgments and 
sentences imposed pursuant to valid guilty pleas.  United 
States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 
 Erwin’s plea agreement constituted a classic 
bargained-for exchange.  Erwin agreed to plead guilty and to 
assist the Government in obtaining guilty pleas from his 
codefendants, conserving Government resources that would 
otherwise have been expended on his prosecution and those 
of his coconspirators.  To ensure that prosecutorial resources 
would not be expended on him in the future, Erwin 
relinquished his right to appeal most aspects of his sentence.  
In return, the Government promised not to initiate additional 
criminal charges against Erwin for his role in the conspiracy, 
and it agreed to seek a § 5K1.1 departure if Erwin cooperated.  
Erwin received the full benefit of his bargain because the 
court accepted his guilty plea (resulting in the speedy 
disposition of his case) and granted the Government’s request 
for a downward departure (yielding a sentence more than four 
years below the statutory maximum).  That Erwin received a 
shorter sentence than he would have in the absence of the 
bargain is evidenced by the court’s telling statement at 
sentencing that “but for” the Government’s motion, it “would 
have been happy” to impose a longer term.  App. 49. 
 
 In contrast to Erwin, who fully benefited from the plea 
agreement, the Government devoted valuable resources to 
litigating an appeal that should never have been filed in the 
first place.  “Empty promises are worthless promises; if 
defendants could retract their waivers . . . then they could not 
obtain concessions by promising not to appeal.  Although any 
given defendant would like to obtain the concession and 
exercise the right as well, prosecutors cannot be fooled in the 
long run.”  United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th 
Cir. 1995).  Erwin is no exception.  He purposely exchanged 
the right to appeal for items that were, to him, of equal or 
greater value.  Having reaped the benefits of his plea 
agreement, he cannot avoid its principal detriment — to put it 
colloquially, he cannot “have his cake and eat it too.”  Id. at 
282.  Under basic principles of contract law, “[d]efendants 
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must take the bitter with the sweet.”  Id. at 283; see also 
United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“Under the law of this circuit, [a defendant] cannot renege on 
his agreement.”).   
 “When the government breaches a plea agreement, the 
general rule is to remand the case to the district court for a 
determination whether to grant specific performance or to 
allow withdrawal of the plea.”  United States v. Nolan-
Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1998).  However, “we 
have allowed for an exception when the circumstances dictate 
that there is only one appropriate remedy for the defendant.”  
Williams, 510 F.3d at 427; see, e.g., United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
permitting withdrawal of the defendant’s plea would “be an 
empty remedy,” as he had already served much of his 
sentence); see also Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241 (noting 
that a court should not impose a remedy against a non-
breaching party’s will).  Similarly, we have observed that 
“when the government requests specific performance at the 
hands of a defendant’s breach [of the plea agreement], . . . 
resentencing under the terms of the executed plea agreement 
might be the only appropriate remedy.”  Williams, 510 F.3d 
at 427–28; see Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241 (agreeing with 
the parties that “if we found a breach of the plea bargain, the 
case should be remanded for a full resentencing”). 
 
 We agree with the Government that specific 
performance is warranted here, and, as in Williams, specific 
performance means de novo resentencing.  As a general 
matter, “[s]pecific performance is feasible and is a lesser 
burden on the government and defendant.”  United States v. 
Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295, 302 (1st Cir. 1990), quoted in 
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241.  Specific performance 
certainly is feasible where, as in this case, the plea agreement 
contained a detailed breach provision: 
 
Should Christopher Erwin . . . violate any 
provision of . . . the plea agreement . . . [the 
United States Attorney’s] Office will be 
released from its obligations under this 
agreement and the plea agreement, including 
any obligation to file a motion under U.S.S.G. § 
5K1.1 . . . . 
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Supp. App. 48 (emphases added).  We previously held that a 
defendant’s breach of his plea agreement in advance of 
sentencing excused the Government from its obligation to 
move for a downward departure.  United States v. Swint, 223 
F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2000).8 
 
 In summary, because Erwin’s breach of the plea 
agreement occurred post-sentencing, we will vacate his 
sentence and remand for resentencing where, in light of his 
breach, the Government will be relieved of its obligation to 
seek a downward departure. 
 
C. 
 
 Unlike in Williams, where the Government appealed 
the judgment of sentence, the Government neither appealed 
nor cross-appealed in this case.  We are therefore confronted 
by, and heard oral argument on, a question of first 
impression:  whether the possibility of de novo resentencing 
is barred by application of the cross-appeal rule, which 
provides that “a party aggrieved by a decision of the district 
court must file an appeal in order to receive relief from the 
decision.”  United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 
F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Am. 
Ry. Express, 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924) (“[A] party who does 
not appeal from a final decree of the trial court . . . may not 
attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own 
rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary . . 
.”).  We conclude that the cross-appeal rule does not apply 
                                              
8 Erwin insists that the Government has “lost its discretion” 
not to request a downward departure, because it has already 
requested one.  Reply Br. 11–12.  While inventive, this 
argument is unpersuasive.  The only reason the Government 
is seeking to withdraw a motion that it has already filed is 
because Erwin elected to breach his agreement after 
benefiting from the motion.  Erwin’s interpretation would 
“eviscerate one purpose of the plea agreement,” namely, “to 
make him earn the downward departure motion.”  Swint, 223 
F.3d at 255. 
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and consequently does not bar the Government from seeking 
de novo resentencing.9 
 First, the Government could not have filed a cross-
appeal even if it wanted to do so.  Congress has vested 
appellate jurisdiction in the Courts of Appeals for review of 
final decisions of the district courts.  “It is axiomatic that only 
a party aggrieved by a final judgment may appeal.”  Rhoads 
v. Ford Motor Co., 514 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 1975).  The 
same is true of cross-appellants.  See, e.g., Am. Gen. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Schoenthal Family, LLC, 555 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellee is not entitled to cross-appeal a 
judgment in his favor.”); Great Am. Audio Corp. v. Metacom, 
Inc., 938 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing cross-appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction); see also United States v. Atiyeh, 402 
F.3d 354, 358 (3d Cir. 2005) (articulating bases of 
jurisdiction over the Government’s cross-appeal).  “A party 
who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved 
by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from 
it.”  Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 
(1980).  This requirement does not derive from the 
jurisdictional limitations of Article III, but rather “from the 
statutes granting appellate jurisdiction and the historic 
practices of the appellate courts.”  Id. 
 
“The Federal Government enjoys no inherent right to 
appeal a criminal judgment . . . .”  Arizona v. Manypenny, 
451 U.S. 232, 246 (1981).  The grant of general appellate 
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 does not authorize such an 
appeal, id., and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (establishing, inter alia, 
appellate jurisdiction over a Government appeal from a 
district court’s order dismissing an indictment or granting a 
new trial), has no relevance here.  See United States v. Ferri, 
686 F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1982).  The sole source of 
authority for a Government appeal in this case would lie, if 
anywhere, in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  That statute permits the 
Government to appeal a defendant’s sentence where the 
sentence:  (1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) resulted 
from an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines; 
                                              
9 In light of this conclusion, we do not resolve whether the 
cross-appeal rule is jurisdictional or a matter of practice and, 
if the latter, whether this case warrants drawing an exception 
to the rule. 
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(3) departed from the applicable Guideline range; or (4) was 
plainly unreasonable, if imposed for an offense where there is 
no applicable Guideline.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).   
 
The Government’s argument does not fall into any of 
these categories, as Erwin’s breach of the plea agreement 
occurred post-sentencing and was in no way sanctioned by 
the District Court.  The District Court gave the Government 
everything it wanted with respect to Erwin’s sentence — that 
is, it imposed a judgment of sentence that resulted from 
offense level 39 and criminal history category I and further 
incorporated the Government’s § 5K1.1 motion.  There was 
(and remains) no “sentencing error” for the Government to 
challenge for purposes of § 3742(b).  It would be nonsensical 
to fault the Government for filing an appeal that we surely 
would have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.10 
 
Moreover, the remedy of de novo resentencing neither 
enlarges the Government’s rights nor lessens Erwin’s.  A 
                                              
10 The Government could have moved to enforce the waiver 
and summarily affirm Erwin’s appeal pursuant to Third 
Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 rather than waiting to raise the issue in 
the ordinary briefing schedule.  See United States v. 
Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 534 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  The 
Government notes that it did not file such a motion in this 
case because it was engaged in negotiations with defense 
counsel regarding the decision to proceed with Erwin’s 
appeal in light of the waiver.  Gov’t Br. 19 n.3.  We 
encourage the Government to seek summary action under 
Rule 27.4 where possible and as early as possible, as doing so 
minimizes the amount of Government (and judicial) resources 
spent on appeals barred by appellate waivers.  However, that 
the Government could have expended fewer resources is of 
no legal moment in this case:  what matters is that Erwin 
breached the agreement, not how costly the breach was.  In 
any event, the costs are not trivial when considered in the 
aggregate — in 2013 alone, nearly 50 motions to enforce an 
appellate waiver were filed within our circuit, the vast 
majority of which were granted. We are not confronted by, 
and therefore need not resolve, whether the Government may 
seek remedies other than summary affirmance of an appeal in 
a Rule 27.4 motion. 
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cross-appeal must be filed to secure a favorable modification 
of the judgment.  See Am. Ry. Express, 265 U.S. at 435.  As 
discussed supra, Erwin contends that the District Court erred 
in its initial Guidelines calculation.  To remedy the error, he 
asks this Court to vacate his sentence and remand for a new 
sentencing hearing.  Our decision to vacate Erwin’s sentence 
and remand for de novo resentencing does not lessen his 
rights, as we are giving him exactly what he asked for.  
Neither does our decision enlarge the Government’s rights:  
as the Government acknowledges, Erwin is free to argue not 
only that he is entitled to a variance, but also that the variance 
should be applied to the statutory maximum instead of to the 
initial Guidelines calculation.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).  Of 
course, the District Court may exercise its discretion to accept 
or reject any such argument pursuant to § 3553(a). 
 
 The Supreme Court’s most recent decision dealing 
with the cross-appeal rule in the criminal context, Greenlaw 
v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008), is not to the contrary.  
The defendant in Greenlaw appealed as too long a 442-month 
sentence.  Id. at 240.  The Government did not appeal or 
cross-appeal.  Id. at 242.  However, to counter the defendant’s 
argument that his sentence was unreasonably long, the 
Government noted that the sentence should have been fifteen 
years longer because he was convicted of two violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).11  Id.  Relying on the plain error rule, 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
sentence and instructed the district court to impose the 
statutorily mandated consecutive minimum sentence, which it 
did.  Id. at 242–43.  The defendant petitioned for certiorari as 
to the following issue:  “When a defendant unsuccessfully 
                                              
11 Under § 924(c)(1)(C)(i), “[i]n the case of a second or 
subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall . 
. . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 
years.”  Any sentence for violating § 924(c) must run 
consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment,” including 
any other conviction under § 924(c).  § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  For 
the first § 924(c) offense, the district court imposed a five-
year sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  As to the second § 
924(c) conviction, the district court erroneously imposed the 
ten-year term prescribed in § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for first-time 
offenses.  554 U.S. at 241–42. 
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challenges his sentence as too high, may a [C]ourt of 
[A]ppeals, on its own initiative, increase the sentence absent a 
cross-appeal by the Government?”  Id. at 243. 
 
 The Supreme Court held that it could not.  It reasoned 
that “[e]ven if there might be circumstances in which it would 
be proper for an appellate court to initiate plain-error review, 
sentencing errors that the Government refrained from 
pursuing would not fit the bill” in light of § 3742(b)’s 
“dispositive direction.”  Id. at 248.  In so holding, the Court 
recognized the importance of providing notice to a criminal 
defendant that “on his own appeal, his sentence would be 
increased.”  Id. at 252–53.  In this case, unlike in Greenlaw, 
the Government did not deliberately disregard a sentencing 
error, and Erwin — whose entire appeal rests on the terms of 
his plea agreement — should have anticipated the possibility 
that he breached the agreement by appealing and thereby 
triggered the possibility of relief for his adversary.  See 
United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] reasonable defendant would understand that his breach 
of the plea agreement would motivate the government to 
[withdraw leniency].”).12 
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held 
that a defendant’s breach of his appellate waiver provision 
permits the Government to seek specific performance of the 
plea agreement, notwithstanding the absence of a 
                                              
12 In United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318 (3d Cir. 1993), a 
pre-Greenlaw decision, the Government argued in response to 
the defendant’s sentencing appeal that the district court 
erroneously calculated the applicable base offense level as 22 
instead of 25.  Id. at 1326.  The Government conceded, and 
we agreed, that its failure to file a cross-appeal precluded it 
from obtaining a sentence “more favorable” than that already 
imposed.  Id. at 1326, 1330.  Our decision in Harvey is 
consistent with Greenlaw — and does not guide our decision 
today — because the Government similarly declined to 
exercise its discretion to correct a sentencing error below that 
it easily could have challenged on appeal.  Whereas 
“fundamental fairness” dictated an outcome favorable to the 
defendant in Harvey and Greenlaw, it dictates an opposite 
conclusion in this case. 
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Government cross-appeal.  In United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 
859 (7th Cir. 2001), the defendant was charged with three 
federal crimes and pleaded guilty to one; the Government 
dismissed the other two and promised to recommend a 
reduction in offense level in exchange for his cooperation.  Id. 
at 860.  The defendant promised, among other things, not to 
appeal from the sentence — a promise that he subsequently 
breached.  Id.  The Court of Appeals held that dismissal of 
Hare’s impermissible appeal would be an “incomplete 
response” because “the prosecutorial resources are down the 
drain.”  Id. at 862.  But the court explained that there is 
another remedy:  “[i]f the defendant does not keep his 
promises, the prosecutor is not bound either.”  Id.  Namely, 
“the United States is free to reinstate dismissed charges and 
continue the prosecution.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007) (determining 
that the Government may argue that “it is no longer bound by 
the plea agreement because the defendant’s appeal amounts to 
a breach of that agreement”).  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ricketts v. Adamson, 
483 U.S. 1 (1987) is also instructive.  The defendant agreed to 
plead guilty to second degree murder and to testify against 
two alleged coconspirators.  Id. at 3.  While the defendant 
testified against the coconspirators in their initial trial, he 
refused to testify again when a retrial was ordered.  Id. at 4.  
The State filed a new information charging the defendant with 
first degree murder, and the defendant’s motion to quash the 
information on double jeopardy grounds was denied.  Id. at 5.  
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s double 
jeopardy claim, holding that the plea agreement “by its very 
terms waives the defense of double jeopardy if the agreement 
is violated.”  Id. at 6 (quotation marks omitted).  On federal 
habeas review, the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant’s 
breach of the plea agreement removed the double jeopardy 
bar to prosecution on the first degree murder charge.  Id. at 8.  
In so holding, the Court emphasized that “[t]he State did not 
force the breach; [the defendant] chose, perhaps for strategic 
reasons or as a gamble, to advance an interpretation of the 
agreement that proved erroneous.”  Id. at 11.  Here too, Erwin 
made a calculated decision to advance an interpretation of his 
appellate waiver that proved erroneous.  It would be unjust to 
permit him to escape the consequences. 
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 Having determined that the cross-appeal rule does not 
apply under these circumstances, we finally consider the 
source of our authority to grant de novo resentencing.  That 
authority can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 2106, which permits us 
to modify, vacate, set aside, or reverse any judgment 
“lawfully brought before [us]” for review.  Section 2106 
further provides that we may remand the cause and direct the 
entry of such appropriate judgment, or “require such further 
proceedings to be had,” as may be just under the 
circumstances.  “[I]n determining what justice does require, 
the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in 
law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.”  
In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 127 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per 
curiam) (quotation marks omitted) (citing § 2106); see also 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (“There may 
always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances 
which will prompt a[n] . . . appellate court, where injustice 
might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which 
were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court . . . 
below.”).   
 
The validity of Erwin’s sentence was lawfully brought 
before us via Erwin’s direct appeal.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
“When an appeal is taken from an order made appealable by 
statute, we have all the powers with respect to that order 
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2106.”  United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 615 F.2d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 1980). 
Since the judgment was entered, there has been a significant 
change in fact (Erwin’s breach of the plea agreement).  As 
discussed at length above, de novo resentencing is not only 
just, but is also consistent with basic principles of contract 
law and the plain language of the plea agreement.   
 
Contrary to Erwin’s position, we do not believe that 
our holding will “end this Court’s review for miscarriage of 
justice.”  Reply Br. 10.  We will continue to review 
conscientiously whether enforcing defendants’ appellate 
waivers would yield a miscarriage of justice (as well as 
whether a waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered into 
and whether the issues raised fall within the scope of the 
waiver) but, as discussed supra, any such defendant must 
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accept the risk that, if he does not succeed, enforcing the 
waiver may not be the only consequence.     
 
Accordingly, we will grant this relief pursuant to § 
2106.   
 
*   *   *   *   * 
 
“[B]oth the government and the defendant must fulfill 
promises made to achieve a plea agreement.”  United States 
v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993).  Yet, “[i]n 
what has become a common sequence, a defendant who 
waived his appellate rights as part of a plea bargain, and 
received a substantial benefit in exchange, has failed to keep 
his promise.”  United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 639 
(7th Cir. 2002).  We hold that, like any defendant who 
breaches a plea agreement in advance of sentencing, a 
defendant who breaches his plea agreement by appealing 
thereby subjects himself to the agreement’s breach provision.  
The breach provision in this case permits the Government to 
withdraw its motion for a downward departure.  To that end, 
we will vacate and remand Erwin’s judgment of sentence.  
Consistent with our precedent, Erwin will be resentenced by a 
different district judge than the one who presided over the 
now-vacated sentence.  See Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241; 
see also Williams, 510 F.3d at 428.13 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Erwin’s 
judgment of sentence and remand to the District Court for 
resentencing before a different judge.  
 
                                              
13 Our precedent compels assigning the case to another judge 
for resentencing “irrespective of the fact that the need for 
resentencing . . . is not attributable to any error by the 
sentencing judge.”  Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241.  We 
emphasize that the reason for the reassignment in this case is 
not due to any error on the sentencing judge’s part and that 
we have no doubt she could resentence Erwin fairly. 
